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ABSTRACT
While most research on gender inequality in organizations has focused on the "glass ceilings"
barring women from obtaining high-status, or management, positions, as women continue to
gain access to these organizational roles, a new question arises: Do women in positions of
power in organizations reduce gender inequality? If they do, then one way to attenuate gender
inequality in organizations would be to increase the prevalence of women in top management
positions. Many of the studies that have explored the relationship between women in
management and gender inequality in organizations have found a positive relationship
between the two. However, other studies show that women in management do not reduce
gender inequality in organizations. There are at least two potential reasons for these
inconsistent results. First, because direct data on the impact of male versus female managers
on the career outcomes of their employees is difficult to obtain, prior studies have measured
the impact of women in positions of power on gender inequality using industry or organization-
level data to find the relationship between the percent of women in management positions and
wage inequality. This is problematic because it is plausible that organizations with more women
in management have less gender inequality not because the female managers are having an
impact, but rather because the same mechanisms driving women into management are also
reducing gender inequality among non-managerial employees. Second, the findings are based
on the assumption that managers have control over the allocation of resources to their
subordinates, so if managers do not always have control over the allocation of resources, then
the results from these studies will be inconclusive. In this paper, I address these two problems
by using unique panel data from a large retail financial services firm to directly measure the
impact of male versus female managers on the career outcomes of their employees. I find that
female managers are more likely to allow their subordinates to use flexible work arrangements
than are male managers and that female managers reduce gender inequality in terms of wages,
but only for subordinates in the lowest organizational ranks. These findings have implications
for research on gender inequality and workplace flexibility.
Thesis Supervisor: Roberto Fernandez
Title: William F. Pounds Professor in Management, Professor of Organization Studies
2
INTRODUcTION
One explanation for the persistence of gender inequality has been the overrepresentation of
men in organizational positions of power with men allocating resources, such as wages, in a
way that benefits other men and disadvantages women (Reskin 2000). As a result, a multitude
of studies have focused on explaining the causes of "glass ceilings", or invisible barriers to entry
barring women from obtaining high-status, or management, positions (Morrison et al. 1987;
Powell & Butterfield 1994; Cotter et al. 2001). The implicit assumption of these studies is that
increasing the prevalence of women in management will lead to the attenuation of gender
inequality in the workplace. Of the limited studies examining whether female managers impact
gender inequality differently than male managers, results have been mixed. Some research
suggests that women in management may actually contribute to the reproduction of workplace
gender inequality (e.g. Deaux 1985; Duguid 2011; Duguid, Lloyd & Tolbert 2012; Penner Toro-
Tulla & Huffman 2012), while other research is more promising for the view that women in
management positions provide a potential solution for gender inequality (e.g., Cotter et al.
1997; Ely 1995; Nelson and Bridges 1999, Cohen & Huffman 2007; Hultin & Szulkin 1999).
One potential reason for these inconsistent results is that, because direct data on the impact of
male versus female managers on the career outcomes of their employees is difficult to get,
prior studies have measured the impact of women in positions of power on gender inequality
using industry- or organization-level data to find the relationship between the percent of
women in top management positions and gender inequality. This is problematic because it is
plausible that organizations with more women in management have less gender inequality not
because the female managers are having an impact, but rather because the same mechanisms
driving women into management are also reducing gender inequality among non-managerial
employees. A second potential reason for these inconsistent results is that these findings are
based on the largely unfounded assumption that managers have control over the allocation of
resources to their subordinates (e.g. Cohen and Huffman 2007, Hultin and Szulkin 1999, Baron
et. al 1991, Penner, Toro-Tulla & Huffman 2012). If managers do not always have control over
the allocation of resources, then the results from these studies will be inconclusive.
I propose that this lack of specificity around reporting relationships and manager control has
led to the inconsistent results seen in the extant literature. In order to uncover whether female
managers attenuate gender inequality, thus providing a potential avenue for attaining
workplace gender equity, it is necessary to compare subordinates of male and female managers
directly in a setting where managers have the power to have an impact on resource allocation.
In this paper, I do this using unique panel data from a large retail financial services firm to
directly measure the impact of male versus female managers on the career outcomes of their
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employees. In this setting, managers have explicit control over setting wages, making hiring and
promotion decisions, and deciding which employees use flexible work arrangements.
In analyzing the effect of female managers on gender inequality for their subordinates, I
proceed as follows. First, I outline existing sociological and organizational theories regarding the
relationship between female managers in positions of power and gender inequality. Second, I
introduce the research setting and analytical method used to test whether female managers
reduce gender inequality in terms of wages, job segregation, and use of flexible work
arrangements. Third, I present results which demonstrate two distinct ways that female
managers contribute to differences in outcomes for subordinates. First, they provide greater
access to flexible work arrangements for both male and female employees. Second, they
provide greater access to equitable wages, but only among employees in the lowest level
organizational position. I conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications
of the research findings for gender inequality in organizations.
THE ROLE OF FEMALE MANAGERS FOR GENDER INEQUALITY: CONFLICTING VIEWS IN THE LITERATURE
While women have historically been missing from the managerial ranks of organizations, over
the past several decades, the representation of women in high-level organizational positions
has risen considerably (Catalyst 2008; Cohen & Huffman 2007). In a 2004 report, the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission found that women represented 36 percent "of all
officials and managers in private sector employment" marking a 7 percent increase over the 12
year period examined, and as of 2010, this number had risen to 41 percent (US Census Bureau
2011). Furthermore, over the past 10 years the presence of women in management has
increased more rapidly than has the presence of men, with 11 million more women in
management compared to 9 million more men (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). Despite this
recent trend, we know surprisingly little about whether the presence of women in management
has an impact on gender inequality within organizations Not only has the research addressing
this question of whether female managers impact the degree of workplace gender inequality
among non-managerial employees been limited, but the studies that have been conducted
have also produced inconsistent results. While some scholars have posited that increasing
women's presence among organizational decision-makers is one avenue for attaining greater
workplace gender equality (e.g., Cotter et al. 1997; Ely 1995; Nelson and Bridges 1999), others
suggest that women in management may not act to mitigate, but rather they may actually
perpetuate, workplace gender inequality (e.g. Deaux 1985; Duguid 2011; Duguid, Lloyd &
Tolbert 2012).
Female Managers Maintain the Inequality Status Quo?
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Some studies would suggest that female managers may perpetuate workplace gender
inequality either through favoring men or not advocating for their female subordinates. Status
characteristics theory posits that gender serves as a widely accepted social distinction where,
generally, there is greater status attributed to male as compared to female actors (Correll and
Ridgeway 2003). As higher-status actors, men are expected to be more competent, have more
influence over others in a group, and have their performances evaluated more positively than
their female counterparts (e.g., Ridgeway and Correll 2004, Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999,
Wagner and Berger 1997). Interestingly, these beliefs about the relative competence of men
and women have been argued to be held by both male and female actors (Ridgeway and Correll
2004, 2006; Heilman & Hayes 2005) with women sharing the same gender biases as men (e.g.
Deaux 1985).
Furthermore, in contrast to the notion that individuals favor members of their in-group or
similar others (McPhereson & Smith-Lovin 1987), some recent management research has
argued that low-status groups, in particular, often express outgroup preference (Ely, 1995;
Chattopadhyay, 1999; Fiske et al., 2002; Chattopadhyay, Tluchowska, and George, 2004).
Similarly, DiTomaso (2007) argues that the members of the ingroup (e.g. white U.S. born males)
receive advantages in both allocation and evaluation decisions from all evaluators, not just
from other members of the ingroup. This does not necessarily imply that members of the
outgroup are discriminated against, but rather that there is an "absence of equivalent
favoritism" for outgroup members (Brewer, 1999: 434). Consistent with this view, a recent
study argues that men, but not women, reporting to a female manager received more job-
related support and were more optimistic about their careers (Maume 2011).
Value threat theory presents a second possible reason that female, similar to male, managers
may serve to maintain the status quo in terms of workplace gender inequality suggesting that
female leaders may not advocate for their female subordinates. Specifically, value threat theory
states that because women fear that others will not perceive them as valuable members of the
organization they will be less apt to support other women within the organization (Duguid
2011; Duguid, Lloyd & Tolbert 2012). Therefore, women in positions with the power to affect
outcomes of subordinates may act similarly to their male counterparts, even if they do not hold
gender stereotypes disadvantaging women. To the extent that both female and male managers
are equally likely to act in a way that favors their male as compared to their female
subordinates, then one would not expect gender inequality to differ based on whether
employees report to a female versus a male manager.
Some studies examining the effect of female managers for gender inequality have drawn
conclusions that support this perspective arguing that women in positions of authority do not
reduce wage inequality (Penner et al 2012; Shin 2012) or the degree of job segregation
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(Stainback & Kwon 2012; DeVaro & Blau 2007). While workplace gender inequality can take
various forms, wage inequality is arguably the most obvious. It is well established that on
average, women in the labor force earn less than men even when controlling for human capital
characteristics such as education and experience (e.g. England et al. 1994; Tomaskovic-Devey et
al. 1996; Hultin 2003). Using within-organization employment records linking individual
employees to their direct managers for a large U.S.-based grocery retailer, Penner and
colleagues (2012) find that female managers do not reduce wage inequality for their
subordinates. Additionally, studies looking at the effect of women in senior leadership roles on
wage inequality have been mixed. While some have found that women in top management
decreases wage inequality (Cardoso & Winter-Ebmer 2010; Shin 2012), others have found that
having women in executive positions has no effect. For example, Shin (2012) examines the
executive wage gap and finds that the gap is narrower for firms with more women on the board
of directors, but there is no difference based on whether the CEO is female. Similarly, in an
examination of wage inequality within small businesses, Penner and Toro-Tulla (2010) finds no
difference based on whether the business owner is male or female.
Job segregation is a second type of gender inequality evident in the labor market referring to
the unequal distribution of men and women across job types, or levels of a hierarchy (Petersen
& Morgan 1995). This gender segregation is the "difference in two groups' (i.e. women and
men) percentage distributions across some set of categories" (Reskin & Bielby 2005:pp), where
the categories may be occupations or individual jobs within an organization. As with studies
focusing on wage inequality, some recent studies have found mixed results in terms of the
impact of female managers on job segregation. In their examination of sex segregation across
organizations in South Korea, Stainback and Kwon (2012) find that the presence of women in
management positions was associated with less sex segregation; however, the presence of
women in supervisory roles was associated with greater levels of sex segregation. They
attribute this to differences in power among these roles stating that managers include positions
that entail "routine decision making responsibilities and are granted substantial organizational
power", whereas supervisors include "positions that hold substantially less organizational
power" (Stainback & Kwon 2012: 224). Additionally, DeVaro & Blau (2007) examines 1,772 urban
establishments from the multi-City Study of Urban Inequality and finds that the odds of a
female being promoted does not differ based on the gender of the manager.
Female Managers Attenuate Inequality?
On the other hand, several scholars have speculated that having women in positions of
organizational power may reduce gender inequality in the workplace, either directly or
indirectly. One set of mechanisms through which women in management are proposed to have
an impact is indirect, as the sheer presence of women among managers is proposed to reduce
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common gender stereotypes and cognitive biases. Specifically, scholars have argued that the
presence of women in the top positions of an organization leads to a decrease in the salience of
gender as a category affecting the views of both managerial and non-managerial employees
(Ely 1995) by reducing gender stereotyping (Konrad, Kramer & Erkut 2008; Ely 1994; Blau,
Ferber & Winkler 2006). Furthermore, having more women in management has been argued to
facilitate communication with organizational leaders for junior women and non-managerial
employees have been shown to be more likely to view female managers as role models (Ely
1994). Insofar as having women among management teams affects gender preconceptions, and
the perception of female leaders in particular, one would expect that, ceteris paribus, gender
inequality would be mitigated.
A second set of mechanisms is related to the direct impact that female managers have on
gender inequality among subordinates through increased mentoring, support, and leadership.
Some scholars have proposed that demographic minorities, such as women, who attain
positions in the top-tier of an organization will serve as advocates for demographically similar
others (lbarra 1995; Ragins & Scandura 1999). Based on theories of gender-based homophily,
female managers are also proposed to alleviate gender inequality within organizations as they
facilitate interpersonal interactions for female non-managerial employees (Hultin & Szulkin
1999, 2003, Ely 1994). As Hultin and Szulkin (1999: 459-60) state "female subordinates should
be advantaged when other women are an integral part of the organization's power structure,
simply because interaction within organizations is facilitated by gender similarity between
actors." Similarly, some studies have posited that female managers are more supportive leaders
who foster the careers of their subordinates, particularly of the women reporting to them
(Helgeson, 1990; Claes, 1999).
Irrespective of whether one or both of these mechanisms are at play, there have been some
studies that produced findings that are consistent with this perspective suggesting that
employees reporting to female managers will experience less gender inequality than those
reporting to male managers. These studies have argued that having a greater proportion of
women in management in a given industry (Cohen & Huffman 2007) or a firm (Hultin & Szulkin
1999) is associated with a narrower wage gap for non-managerial employees in that setting,
concluding that female managers reduce gender-based wage inequality. Similarly, studies
comparing the gender distribution of non-managerial workers relative to the presence of
women in management have largely concluded that female managers attenuate this form of
inequality (Baron, Mittman & Newman 1991; Kulis 1997; Pfeffer, Davis-Blake & Julius 1995;
Huffman, Cohen & Pearlman 2010). For example, Baron et al. (Baron, Mittman & Newman
1991) compares of the gender distribution of non-managerial employees in various state
agencies with varying proportions of women in management concluding that the higher the
proportion of women in management of a given agency the less gender segregation evident.
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Using EEO-1 data, Huffman and colleagues (2010) find that that there is less sex segregation
among non-managerial workers in organizations where there are more women in management
(Huffman, Cohen & Pearlman 2010).
In addition to wages and allocation to jobs, organizational employees may face gender-based
inequities in terms of other resources such as flexible work arrangements. Some studies
suggest that the presence of formal policies will be higher in organizations that have more
women in management (Dreher 2003). Similarly, Dobbin and Kalev (2009) find that
organizations with a higher proportion of women, particularly white women, in management
are more likely to adopt diversity programs. These studies suggest that employees reporting to
female managers will be more apt to use flexible work hours than will those reporting to male
managers. While various studies indicate that managers play a critical role in whether
organizations adopt formal flexibility policies, to my knowledge, there has not been any
examination looking at differences in the use of flexibility by employees reporting to male
versus female managers.
THE MISSING PIECES: REPORTING RELATIONSHIPS AND MANAGERIAL POWER
Given that research examining the role of female managers for gender inequality has produced
inconsistent findings, I propose that we must question the theoretical assumptions and
methodological approaches that have been employed in conducting these studies. Specifically,
extant research has largely taken for granted reporting relationships and managerial control;
two factors, as I will argue, that are critical in accurately addressing this question. To the extent
that managers impact employee outcomes, they are most apt to have an effect on those
employees reporting to them directly. Therefore, in order to determine whether male and
female managers have a differential effect on gender inequality among non-managerial
employees, it is necessary to compare employees reporting directly to male and female
managers. Despite using aggregate industry-level data in their analyses, Cohen and Huffman
(2007) highlights the importance of considering true reporting structures stating that they
"remain interested in within-organization effects of managerial composition on gender
inequality...this more direct effect remains the most plausible pathway by which female
managers influence gendered outcomes." Similarly, using organizational-level data, Hultin and
Szulkin (2003) finds that the presence of women among lower-level managers, who are likely
the direct managers of non-managerial employees, had a greater effect on wage inequality
than did women among higher-level managers. Yet most studies examining the relationship
between manger gender and gender-based inequality base findings on analyses of datasets that
do not match individual employees to the male and female managers to whom they report (see
Penner, Toro-Tulla & Huffman 2012 for an exception).
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These studies draw conclusions about whether female managers reduce gender inequality
based on analyses of whether a higher proportion of women in management is associated with
less gender inequality among non-managerial employees in a given setting (e.g. Cohen &
Huffman 2007; Hultin & Szuklin 1999; Cohen, Broschak & Haveman 1998; Kurtulis &
Tomaskovic-Devey 2009; Giuliano, Leonard & Levine 2006). Rather than looking at differences
in gender inequality for subordinates of male versus female- managers, these studies
approximate manager-subordinate reporting relationships using aggregate level data at either
the industry- or organization-level. These aggregate-level data are not appropriate for
addressing the intended research question as there are risks of ecological fallacy' or spurious
associations. This is particularly problematic for studies exploring these dynamics across
organizations. For example, it is plausible that organizations with more women in management
have less gender inequality not because the female managers are having an impact, but rather
because the same mechanisms driving women into management is also reducing gender
inequality among non-managerial employees.
A second critical aspect that must be considered in any examination of the role of female
managers on gender inequality is managerial control, or power. Power can be broadly defined
as having control over other actors, resources, and things (Wolf and Fligstein 1979). In
conceptualizing managerial power in an organizational context, I build upon Elliot and Smith's
(2004) definition, defining power as authority and control over subordinates and desirable
organizational resources. One critical aspect of managerial power for studies examining
difference in the effect of female, relative to male, managers on workplace gender inequality is
that this power stems from the actor's position as manager. Weber ([1914] 1968) defined this
type of positional power as "legitimate authority" as it is not innate to the actor, but rather
arises from the structural position that an actor occupies. Therefore, while generally managers
possess some positional power over their subordinates or resources, the scope and bounds of
that power is context specific. Yet extant research has largely made the critical assumption that
managers have control over the allocation of resource to subordinates (e.g. Cohen and Huffman
2007, Hultin and Szulkin 1999, Baron et al. 1991, Penner, Toro-Tulla & Huffman 2012).
In order for managers to impact resource allocation as it pertains to their subordinates, it is
necessary that they possess the power to do so and the impact of their actions is contingent on
the manager's power and authority to influence outcomes (Ely 1995; Nelson and Bridges 1999;
Cohen & Huffman 2007) in that setting. In other words, differences in gendered outcomes, such
as the gender wage gap and gender-based job segregation, can only be attributed to the
managers to the extent that those managers have control over their subordinates' wages,
hiring and promotion. Stainback and Kwon's (2012: pp) finding that female managers, who are
1Figure 1A in the Appendix provides an illustration of this risk.
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"granted substantial organizational power", have an impact, whereas supervisors, who "hold
substantially less organizational power", did not have an impact, in a study that spanned many
organizations, provides support for the importance of knowing the nature of managerial power
in a given context.
In the case of Penner and colleagues' (2012) study using within-organization employment
records for a large U.S.-based grocery retailer to accurately link individual employees to their
direct managers, limited managerial control over wages may provide an alternative explanation
for their finding that female managers do not reduce wage inequality. While this research
matches employees to managers, the grocery retailer they study operates under collective
bargaining agreement, which may restrict the level of control managers have over wages2.
Given that differences in gendered outcomes, such as the gender wage gap, can only be
attributed to the managers to the extent that those managers have control over subordinates'
wages, examining these dynamics in a unionized setting is not ideal. It is plausible that their
finding that female managers do not attenuate gender wage inequality in this grocery retailer is
actually due to the fact that managers do not have control over wages in this setting. Assuming
that managers possess the necessary control over resources is problematic such that if
managers in actuality do not have control the results from these studies are inconclusive.
I argue that in order to accurately assess whether, and under what conditions, female managers
affect the allocation of resources for non-managerial employees, studies must examine
differences in gender inequality for those reporting directly to male and female managers, in
settings where managers have unhindered control over relevant resources. Inconsistencies in
extant research may be attributed to the fact that these issues have not been simultaneously
considered. Using a unique research setting where I am able to link non-managerial employees
to their immediate manager and where managers have explicit control over relevant resources,
this study more accurately identifies whether, and under what conditions, female managers
impact workplace gender inequality, particularly in terms of wages, job segregation, and use of
flexible work arrangements.
WHY Focus ON WAGES,. JOB SEGREGATION AND FLEXIBILITY?
2 Penner et al. (2012) makes the claim that managers have control in their research setting; however the retail
grocer they study has several distinct features that cast doubt on the appropriateness of this setting for addressing
whether female managers impact wage inequality. First, as the original paper analyzing these data states, "all non-
managerial employees were covered by collective bargaining agreements" in this setting (Ransom & Oaxaca 2005:
222). Furthermore, this employer was found guilty in a gender discrimination suit having "to pay several million
dollars in 'back pay"' (Ransom & Oaxaca 2005: 221). Lastly, the within job wage ranges for both non-managerial
and managerial employees were narrow, with standard deviations for hourly wages ranging from $0.00 to $1.13.
Therefore, while the authors do not find that female managers reduce gender inequality, it is plausible that this
finding may be attributed to particular features of the setting. For additional details on this setting, see Ransom &
Oaxaca 2005.
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In addition to there being scant research exploring the relationship between manager gender
and gender inequality, this body of research has been limited in the scope of gender inequality
outcomes considered. The vast majority of research in this tradition has focused on identifying
whether the proportion of women in management is associated with a narrower gender wage
gap (Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer 2010; Cohen and Huffman 2007; Hultin and Szulkin 1999,
2003; Penner and Toro-Tulla 2010; Penner, Toro-Tulla, and Huffman 2012). Given that results
from extant studies have been mixed, this first study examining the impact of female managers
on wage inequality on their direct subordinates, in a professional setting where managers have
explicit control over wages, is an opportunity to contribute to our understanding of the impact
of female managers on gender inequality.
Similarly research has produced inconsistent findings related to the role of female managers for
sex segregation (e.g. Huffman, Cohen, and Pearlman 2010; Stainback and Kwon 2012, Baron,
Mittman & Newman 1991, Kulis 1997) and access to positions of authority (Skaggs, Stainback &
Duncan 2012, Cohen, Broschak, and Havemen 1998) for other women. In their 1995 study,
Peterson and Morgan argue that the gender wage gap is largely eradicated when men and
women in the same job are compared (see also Kilbourne et al. 1994). In other words, allocative
processes account for a large part of wage inequality (Petersen and Saporta 2004; Fernandez
and Mors 2008). Therefore, to fully understand whether female managers impact gender
inequality, it is necessary to examine whether the degree of gender-based job segregation
differs among employees reporting to female versus male managers. While supply-side factors
have been found to contribute to the gender composition of jobs (Fernandez & Abraham 2011;
Fernandez & Fernandez-Mateo ; Barbulescu & Bidwell 2012), many economic and
organizational sociologists have argued that organizational factors also play a role (Baron, 1984;
Bielby and Baron, 1986; Nelson and Bridges, 1999; Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs, 1999;
Ssrensen, 2007). This study contributes to our knowledge of whether female managers affect
job segregation by comparing the gender composition of jobs for employees reporting directly
to female versus male managers.
Arguably inequalities in wages, hiring and promotion are the most obvious forms of workplace
gender inequality, however, organizational employees may face gender-based inequities in
terms of access to other resources, such as flexible work arrangements. While one argument
against perceiving access to flexibility as a resource is that flexible work is sometimes linked to
penalties for employees3, there is also evidence that employees working under flexible work
3 In the research setting presented herein, a comparison of hourly wages of part-time and full-time employees
reveals that employees to not suffer a wage penalty for using flexible work arrangements. Also, part-time
employees working at least 25 hours per week are eligible for all of the benefits available to full-time employees
including, medical benefits, company match to retirement savings plan contributions, tuition reimbursement and
paid time off.
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arrangements "earn wages at least equal to their fixed schedule counterparts" (Weeden 2005).
Furthermore, studies have argued that both male and female workers cite flexibility as the most
desirable feature to have in a job (Glass & Estes 1997; Golden 2001) as it enables employees to
manage their work and non-work responsibilities. While this preference exists, opportunities
for flexible work vary greatly, both across and within organizations (Kelly & Kalev 2006;
Wharton & Blair-Loy 2008). As Galinsky and colleagues (1996) argue, managerial support is not
only important, but may actually be more significant than formal policies in determining the use
of flexibility in organizations. While we know that flexibility is a desired work feature, and that
managers play a vital role in allocating flexibility, to my knowledge, there is no direct
examination looking at manager-employee relations to determine how the use of flexibility
varies by the gender of the manager.
By examining the impact of female managers on multiple forms of gender inequality
simultaneously, in a setting where managers have control over resource allocation of their
direct subordinates, provides an opportunity adjudicate between extant competing
explanations of the role of female versus male managers. The goal of this study is to sharpen
our understanding of whether, and under what conditions, male and female managers differ in
how they affect workplace gender inequality among the non-managerial employees reporting
to them.
DATA AND METHODS
Research Setting
I examine the relationship between manager gender and three distinct outcomes - wage
inequality, job segregation, and the relative usage of flexible work arrangements - for non-
managerial employees through a case study of multiple branches in a globally diversified
financial services firm (FinServ). FinServ provided the annual personnel databases for all
employees in its U.S. operations for the 41-month period from January 1996 through May 1999
(the study period). These databases capture demographic characteristics, including gender,
race, and age, as well as employment specific characteristics, including tenure, salary, and full-
time status (either full-time or part-time). In order to accurately understand whether male and
female managers have differential effects on gender inequality in terms of wages, job
allocation, or the use of flexibility, it is necessary to have data on entire work groups where the
reporting structure between manager and non-managerial workers can be definitively
identified. Therefore, this study focuses on a subset of FinServ, namely the retail branches,
where the databases included complete workgroups with organizational codes linking
individual managers to each non-managerial employee reporting to them. This is a key feature
of these data as it enables me to definitively identify reporting relationships for all employees
included in this analysis. Extant studies have largely (see Penner, Toro-Tulla, and Huffman 2012
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for an exception) simulated manager-employee relationships using aggregate industry- and
organization-level data, as opposed to data representing actual reporting relationships (e.g.
Cohen & Huffman 2007; Hultin & Szuklin 1999; Cohen, Broschak & Haveman 1998; Kurtulis &
Tomaskovic-Devey 2009; Giuliano, Leonard & Levine 2006). Since managers are most likely to
have an impact on those employees reporting to them directly, these data provide a uniquely
well-suited setting for understanding the impact of female managers on gender inequality.
Given that such data are difficult to access, especially across multiple firms, I exploit the
richness of data that results from focusing on a single firm (see Sorensen 2003, Fernandez et al.
2000 and Petersen et al. 2000 for similar approaches). This direct analysis enables me to more
accurately explore whether the gender of one's manager has an impact on wage inequality,
degree of job segregation, or relative use of flexibility by male and female employees than has
been examined in the past.
FinServ's retail branches are client facing offices that offer a wide range of financial products
and services to retail financial services customers. Among others, these services and products
include mutual fund accounts, mortgages and margin lending accounts. These retail branches
employ individuals in 6 unique positions: 5 non-managerial and 1 managerial. Each branch
employs an average of approximately 8 non-managerial workers (SD = 2.91) each reporting to a
single branch manager. Using several HR databases, I was able to construct a longitudinal
database for all 1,992 non-managerial employees and 156 managers employed in FinServ's 120
retail branches across 8 U.S. states during the study period. This database is unbalanced, with
each employee having between 1 and 4 years of data4, for a total of 3,888 person years - 357
person years are branch managers and 3,531 person years are non-managerial employees.
Since longitudinal models used in the analysis of wage inequality exclude persons with single
observations, all data analyses employed the same exclusion - a total of 882 persons5 - in order
to base comparisons on the same cases. The final analyses are based on 3,006 person years -
2,649 non-managerial and 357 managers - or 1,266 persons - 1,110 non-managerial employees
and 156 managers.
In addition to the aforementioned personnel data, this analysis draws on several organizational
documents, including manager training documents and FinServ's Employee Handbook (herein,
Handbook), to illustrate the role of managers in this setting. In a branch manager training
4 Employees in this setting may be present for all years in the study, enter the retail branches after the beginning
of the study (i.e. left censored), exit the retail branches before the end of the study window (i.e. right censored), or
both enter the retail branches after the beginning of the study window and exit before the end of the study
window (i.e. both right and left censored).
s For 882 individuals, there is a single observation as these people are right, left, or both right and left censored. All
persons with 1 year of observations were non-managerial employees, therefore none of the excluded persons
were managers. The gender composition of these excluded non-managerial employees mirrors the study
population as 69.5% of these persons are female.
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session conducted the year before the start of the study window, for example, managers were
encouraged to act in an entrepreneurial capacity as they were instructed to "behave like you
are in business for yourself" and to "hold yourself accountable for outcomes". In terms of
compensation in particular, an organizational goal to "empower managers to make
compensation decisions" and to "institute flexible versus mechanical compensation" was
reiterated to managers during this training session. When addressing the degree of control that
managers have over compensation, the Handbook similarly indicates that the "branch manager
owns compensation decisions". In terms of hiring and promotion, the branch manager
"recruits, trains, manages, and develops a high performance team", "identifies staffing levels",
and "plans, approves, and appropriately paces all training". While HR plays a supporting role to
"help supervisors review and plan employment activities" and encourages managers to "give
preference to internals", managers have control over hiring and promotion decisions as they
are empowered to select an appropriate candidate for an opening. Similarly in terms of
allowing employees to use flexible work options the Handbook indicates that managers "are
encouraged to explore and use flexible work options" and the manager "has the final decision
as to who may participate and may adjust work schedules at any time". Whereas existing
studies make the critical assumption that managers have control over the decisions impacting
relevant outcomes (e.g. Cohen and Huffman 2007, Hultin and Szulkin 1999, Baron et. al 1991,
Penner, Toro-Tulla, and Huffman 2012), together these organizational statements provide
explicit evidence that the branch managers in this setting indeed have control over wages,
allocation to jobs, and use of flexible work options for their subordinates.
By examining differences between male and female managers within FinServ's retail branches, I
am also able to compare structurally equivalent "organizations" (i.e. branches). Each manager
in this setting oversees a single comparable branch that employees individuals in each of the
non-managerial positions. These managers operate under the same organizational guidelines,
particularly as related to the outcomes of interest in this study. Therefore, this analysis exploits
within organization variation in these subunits, while controlling for potentially confounding
attributes that may vary across branches. In other words, by focusing on the retail branches of
FinServ, this study is better able to disentangle whether the gender of an employee's manager
has implications for gender inequality by isolating manager gender and controlling factors such
as organizational policies, manager tenure, and work group size. Together, these features make
the retail branches of FinServ well-suited for understanding whether female managers have an
impact on gender inequality among the non-managerial employees reporting to them.
Analyses and Measures
Using personnel data on compensation, job segregation, and use of flexible work arrangements
from this single organizational setting, I estimate three sets of models to examine whether
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gender inequality outcomes differ based on manager gender. First, I use multivariate analyses
with the logarithm of pre-tax hourly wages as the dependent variable to examine whether
relative wages for male and female employees differs by manager gender. Because employees
in this setting are nested within branches, individuals within branches may have more in
common than individuals across branches. This indicates that employees within branches may
not be independent, violating a key assumption of ordinary least squares (OLS), therefore OLS
may result in biased estimates of standard errors (Osborne, 2000). Furthermore, the data I am
analyzing are pooled, cross-sectional time series (yearly) data. A common approach for
analyzing data that are structured in this way is to use fixed-effects models, which would
capture within-individual and within-branch, over time variation. Given my research question, I
am inherently interested in the gender of non-managerial employees and the gender of branch
manager, two attributes that are time-invariant6. Therefore, a fixed-effects model is not
suitable for this study as both employee gender and branch manager gender would be dropped
from such models. Therefore, I estimate various cross-sectional time-series linear models using
the method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) 7.
As aforementioned, the data that I am analyzing are unbalanced as individuals may enter the
dataset after the start of the study window and/or exit before the close of the study window.
Given that these data include repeat observations for individuals? over time, I ran diagnostics to
test the assumptions of homoscedasticity and that errors are not auto-correlated across time
periods. As expected, errors in these data are heteroskedastistic, as the variance of the errors
varies across individual non-managerial employees. Additionally, the Woolridge test for
autocorrelation in panel data reveals that there exists first-order auto-correlation, where the
errors at time t are correlated with the errors at time t-1. Thus, longitudinal GEE models are
used to estimate the effect of manager gender on gender-based wage inequality which account
for both heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation.
6 Theoretically, branch manager may vary in cases where a branch is managed by a female manager in one year
and a male manager in a subsequent year (or vice versa), for example. During this time period, however, these
switches in manager gender were very rare. Only 3 branches, for a total of 4 percent of persons, experienced such
an event. Furthermore, the direction of this switch in branch manager gender was not consistent: 1 branch went
from having a female to a male manager and the other 2 branches went from a male to a female manager. In most
cases this switch in manager occurred in either the first or the last year of the study period making the period of
time that either the initial or subsequent manager was in charge of the branch insufficient for drawing
comparisons between managers within a branch. Therefore, branch fixed effects would not allow for estimating
parameters for the effect of manager gender for most cases in this study.
Results are largely consistent when estimating models using less structure on the variance-covariance matrix (i.e.
OLS).
8 For 882 individuals, there is a single observation as these people are right, left, or both right and left censored.
Therefore, when clustering standard errors to account for the fact that errors are correlated across time periods by
individual, these 882 individuals are dropped from the analysis. All models, then, are based on the remaining 2,649
person-years for those individuals with 2 or more observation.
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All wage models focus on two main independent variables: non-managerial employee gender (
female:1 if female, 0 if male), and manager gender (manager female: 1 if female, 0 otherwise).
Additionally, all of the wage models include controls for a number of characteristics of
individual non-managerial employees including a set of dummy variables for four of the five
racial categories, with the largest category, Caucasian, being omitted as the reference category;
employee age; employee tenure; and marital status (married: 1 if married, 0 otherwise).
Additionally, the interaction of employee gender and marital status (female x married) is
included in all wage models as some gender scholars have found that differences in pay and
promotion are related to expectations about workers family responsibilities (Roth 2008). The
notion of the "unencumbered ideal worker" (Bailyn, Drago & Kochan 2011) suggests that
managers may prefer single male employees most. By including the main and interaction
effects for marital status, these models account for this possible association. Models also
include a control for manager tenure, as male and female managers differ in average tenure. A
third set of controls are related to characteristics of the individual branches. One argument may
be that larger branches are of higher status indicating that managers of larger branches may
differ in some substantive way from managers of smaller branches. Therefore, all models
control for branch size. Lastly, all models include state fixed effects for the state where the
branch is located to account for any regional differences in wages.
Second, I use log linear hierarchical models to examine whether job segregation or the relative
use of flexible work varies for employees based on manager gender. Log-linear models are a
special class of models that appropriately deal with comparisons of categorical data (Haberman
1978; Bishop Fienberg & Holland 1975). Specifically, these models uncover the potential
relationships among categorical variables in a multiway contingency table. In terms of job
segregation, log linear models allow for testing the null hypothesis that manager gender is
independent of the joint distribution of male and female employees to the five non-managerial
branch jobs. In order to test whether the gender composition of jobs across the branch
hierarchy is the same for employees reporting to female and male managers, I estimate the
following log-linear model
{FTROES} {M}
where F is female, T is teller, R is representative, 0 is officer, E is executive, S is relationship
manager, and M is manager female.
Similarly for use of flexible work arrangements, log linear models allow for testing the null
hypothesis that manager gender is independent of the joint distribution of male and female
employees to flexible work arrangements. In this study, flexible work is measured as part-time
work, or more specifically whether non-managerial employees are employed as part-time
employees. This variable is measured by a dichotomous dummy variable, part-time (1=part-
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time, O=full-time). In this setting part-time work provides evidence of both reduced work hours
and flexibility in scheduling given that branches operate during normal business hours (i.e.
approximately 8:30am-6:00pm). Therefore, part-time employees work different shifts within
this window. In order to test whether the relative use of part-time by female versus male
employees is the same for employees reporting to female and male managers, I estimate the
following log-linear model
{FP} {M}
where F is female, P is part-time, and M is manager female.
RESULTS
The branch employees in this setting span 6 distinct organizational positions: teller,
representative, officer, account executive, relationship manager, and branch manager. The first
5 positions listed are non-managerial positions, each of which may be either exempt or non-
exempt, and the last position, branch manager, is exempt. Individuals in these non-managerial
positions report directly to the branch manager. Figure 1 depicts the hierarchy of positions, as
claimed in FinServ documents as the "career path within a branch", as well as the key
responsibilities of each role. FinServ terms non-managerial positions within the branch
"manage self" positions, as these positions not have any personnel management
responsibilities. The position of branch manager is the only "manage others" position, as a key
set of responsibilities is related to personnel management and managing the branch team.
[Insert FIGURE 1 about here]
While the positions to the left of the dotted line in figure 1 do not have managerial
responsibilities, there is a clear hierarchy among the non-managerial branch positions in terms
of responsibilities and wages. There is a structure of "cumulative skills and knowledge" within
the branches of FinServ such that incumbents of each position were expected to be expert in
particular skills associated with their position as well as the skills of each lower level position.
For example, representatives are focused on unsecured products and sales and service, but
they are also responsible for the tasks of tellers, namely basic products and transactions. Table
19 reports the distribution of employees across branch positions and mean hourly wages for
each branch position. Consistent with this branch hierarchy, the mean hourly wage increases
steadily with the lowest position being teller (mean = $12.24, SD = $1.82) and the highest non-
managerial position being relationship manager (mean = $32.17, SD = $7.90). The mean hourly
wage increases by a minimum of $2.65 (mean of $4.35) for each increase in non-managerial
9 For simplicity, all descriptive statistics are presented for 1999. The patterns presented in each of the descriptive
tables for 1999 are consistent with similar tables constructed for each of the 4 years, 1996 - 1999, included in this
study.
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position along this hierarchy. In terms of the distribution of non-managerial employees across
the branch hierarchy, table 1 shows that over 70 percent of all employees occupy the lower-
level positions of teller, representative and officer.
[Insert TABLE 1 about here]
The branch managers comprise approximately 15 percent of all employees in the retail
branches. Of particular interest for this study, each branch is head by a single manager and
these managers are the sole employees in the retail branches with personnel responsibilities
overseeing all other employees and branch operations. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for
branch managers, both overall and by manager gender. The average hourly wage for managers
was approximately $33.98 in 1999 (SD = $7.55) with approximately 46 percent of managers
being female. Given that the focus of this study is to determine whether the degree of gender
inequality among employees differs based on the gender of their manager, it is important to
identify if male and female managers in this setting differ in any substantive ways other than
gender. While female managers earn slightly less than male managers on average, this
difference in wages is not significant. Similarly, male and female managers do not differ
significantly in either their racial composition, with both groups being equally diverse in terms
of race, or age. Female managers are more tenured, however, having over 4 years more tenure
(P<.05), on average, when compared to male managers. To the extent that more experienced
managers have more power within the organization, this difference indicates that female
managers should possess at least as much control over resource allocation as male managers.
In order to be certain that any observed effect of female managers on gender inequality among
subordinates is not attributed to this difference, all models used in this analysis control for
manager tenure.
[Insert TABLE 2 about here]
The first column of table 3 presents overall descriptive statistics for male and female non-
managerial employees irrespective of whether they report to a male or female manager. The
second and third columns of table 3 separate non-managerial employees based on the gender
of their manager to determine whether the employees reporting to male and female managers
differ in any substantive way'0. As column 1 of table 3 reveals, on average there are 8 non-
managerial employees in each branch and approximately 70 percent of all non-managerial
employees are female. Comparing overall mean hourly wages across all jobs for female and
10 Educational information (i.e. highest degree) is only populated for 35 percent of employees included in the study
population. This information is provided by employees on a voluntarily basis. Since it is unclear whether this
information is missing at random, education is not included in the main analyses. As Table Al in the appendix
shows, for employees with education information, there are no significant differences in education for employees
reporting to male versus female managers.
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male employees indicates that female employees earn approximately 74 cents for every dollar
that men earn (P<.001). Female employees are nearly 5 times as likely to work part time
(P<.05), are about 2 years older, and have nearly 2 more years of tenure on average (P<.05)
than men. Male and female employees do not differ, however, in their likelihood of being
married or in terms of racial composition.
[Insert TABLE 3 about here]
Given the aim of this study, it is necessary to not only determine whether male and female non-
managerial employees differ, but also whether male and female managers oversee comparable
individuals. The second 2 columns of table 3 present key descriptive statistics for all variables of
interest for employees by branch manager gender allowing for a comparison of female non-
managerial employees, as well as male employees, reporting to female versus male managers.
The final column of table 3 presents the results of t-tests of these within non-managerial
employee gender comparisons. Male and female managers oversee branches that are similarly
female, but female managers manage smaller branches on average (7 versus 8 employees,
P<.001). Neither male nor female non-managerial employees reporting to female managers
differ significantly in terms of wages, the propensity to work part-time, or race when compared
to those reporting to male managers. Female non-managerial employees reporting to female
managers do have longer tenure on average (8 vs. 6.2 years, P<.05) than female employees
reporting to male managers. While average tenure for male employees does not differ, male
employees reporting to female managers are older (38.6 vs. 35.2 years, P<.05) and more likely
to be married (57.8 vs. 39.5%, P<.05) than those men reporting to male managers. Models
account for these differences controlling for non-managerial age, tenure, and marital status, as
well as branch size.
Female Managers and Wages
Table 4 presents results from the three models estimating the effect of manager gender on
non-managerial employee log hourly wages. Model 1 reveals that, irrespective of manager
gender, non-managerial female employees earn 14.9 percent (p < .001) less than their male
counterparts. In order to assess whether female managers impact this evident gender
inequality in wages, Model 2 introduces both the main effect of manager gender and the
interaction effect between manager gender and gender of the non-managerial employee. First,
the negative effect of female remains, indicating that among employees reporting to male
managers (the reference category for manager female), female employees earn approximately
16 percent (p < .05) less than male employees. The negative main effect of manager gender
indicates that non-managerial male employees (the reference category for female) reporting to
female managers earn 5.2 percent less (p <.05) than those reporting to male managers.
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[Insert TABLE 4 about here]
The relevant comparison for testing the proposition that female managers will reduce wage
inequality, however, is whether the wage gap between male and female employees is lower
among those reporting to female managers as compared to those reporting to male managers.
Given that the coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant, we can conclude that this is
not the case. While employees reporting to female managers earn less than those reporting to
male managers, the relative wage for female versus male employees, or the gender wage gap,
does not differ based on manager gender.
Thus far, this analysis has not compared male and female non-managerial employees working
in the same organizational positions, or jobs. As aforementioned, the gender wage gap has
been shown to virtually disappear when men and women in the same job are compared (e.g.
Petersen and Morgan 1995; Kilbourne et al. 1994; Petersen and Saporta 2004; Fernandez and
Mors 2008). Therefore, to fully understand whether female managers impact wage inequality,
it is necessary to compare wages for male and female non-managerial employees within branch
position. Model 3 is a fully interacted model estimating the effect of manager gender on male
versus female employee wages, introducing dummy variables for the non-managerial branch
positions (teller is the omitted category). It is worth noting that the positive relationship
between each of the dummy variables for the non-managerial positions indicates that male
representatives, officers, account executives, and relationship managers reporting to male
managers earn 16, 37, 58, and 79 percent more, respectively, than male tellers reporting to
male managers. This pattern is in line with the pattern revealed in Table 1, that mean wages for
each job are significantly higher than mean wages for the reference category of teller. Since
teller is the omitted branch position, the observed negative relationship between employee
gender and wages reflects the within-job gender wage gap for tellers reporting to male
managers (the reference group for manager female). Among tellers reporting to male
managers, female tellers earn 5 percent less (p <.05) than male tellers. The within-job gender
wage gap for each of the other four branch positions is presented by the two-way interactions
between employee gender (female) and each of the branch position. These results indicate that
other than tellers, gender wage inequality only exists among executives with female executives
earning nearly 8 percent less than their male counterparts. Therefore, consistent with extant
theory, once we compare wages for men and women working in the same branch positions,
wage inequality is largely reduced.
In order to determine whether female managers reduce wage inequality within branch
position, it is necessary to compare the relative wages of male and female employees reporting
to female versus male managers. These effects are represented by the coefficients of manager
gender (main effect, two-way interactions, and three-way interactions). The negative main
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effect of manager gender indicates that male tellers reporting to female managers earn 3
percent less (p < .10) than those reporting to male managers. Additionally, the positive
coefficient of the interaction of manager gender and employee gender indicates that female
tellers earn nearly 4 percent more when reporting to a female versus a male manager. Together
these results indicate that female managers attenuate gender wage inequality among tellers.
The only other position where there is evidence of gender wage inequality is among executives,
with female executives earning nearly 8 percent less than male executives. This wage
inequality, however, does not differ based on manager gender.
To illustrate how this gender wage inequality among tellers differs based on whether
employees report to a female or a male manager I used the coefficients from model 3 (Table 4)
to construct the 2 by 2 table presented in table 5. This table compares the mean hourly wages
for the typical" male and female teller based on whether they report to a male or female
manager. These figures allow for a comparison of the gender wage gap among tellers reporting
to female relative to male managers. Among tellers reporting to female managers, female
tellers earn 99 cents for every dollar that male tellers earn. Comparatively, female tellers earn
95 cents for every dollar that male tellers earn when employees reporting to male managers
are considered. This result provides some support that female managers attenuate wage
inequality for subordinates when compared to their male counterparts. There is less gender
inequality in terms of wages for subordinates reporting directly to female managers, however,
this effect is limited to the lowest position in the organizational hierarchy, that of teller.
Female Managers and Job Segregation
In terms of the distribution of female non-managerial employees across the levels of the branch
hierarchy, figure 2 illustrates the degree to which jobs are segregated in terms of gender, by
level. Consistent with the glass ceiling hypothesis, the proportion of women in lower-level
positions of teller and representative is considerably higher than the proportion of women in
the higher-level positions of account executive and relationship manager (p<.Ol; LR chi-square
= 163.35, d.f. = 4). While this pattern is evident, this is simply a descriptive pattern as these are
post-hire data which do not provide insight into the mechanisms leading to this apparent glass
ceiling (for a discussion of the limitations of post-hire data see Fernandez and Weinberg 1997;
Fernandez and Abraham 2013). For example, not knowing the proportion of women that are in
the consideration set for higher-level positions (i.e. relationship manager) makes it equally
plausible that 1) women are simply not applying to higher level jobs (as has been shown by
1 Predicted values for hourly salary were calculated using Model 3 (Table 5) for a typical teller profile: a white,
single individual, working fulltime, with average tenure and age reporting to a manager with average tenure. The
resulting natural logarithm of hourly wages for each group (e.g. men reporting to male managers) was then
exponentiated for ease of interpretation. This approach, as opposed to simply calculating means for groups, allows
mean hourly wages to take into account all controls from Model 3.
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Barbulescu & Bidwell 2012 and Abraham & Fernandez 2011, for example) or 2) managers are
showing a preference for male applicants for higher level jobs. In order to isolate the
mechanisms at play in creating these observed patterns it is necessary to examine pre-hire data
(see Fernandez & Abraham 2011 and Fernandez and Weinberg 1997 for an example).
[insert FIG 2 and FIG 3 about here]
In the absence of data on the applicant pools, however, these analyses can at least determine
whether the observed glass ceiling pattern differs based on whether employees report to a
male versus a female manager. As figure 2 illustrates, this descriptive pattern appears to be
quite similar for subordinates of both female and male managers. Model 1 in table 6 presents
the likelihood ratio chi-squared statistics and related p-values for the log-linear independence
models for each of the four years included in these data to test whether the gender
composition of jobs differ based on manager gender. This model tests the null hypotheses that
the distribution of male and female employees across the five levels of the branch hierarchy is
independent of manager gender. While I am not able to draw any conclusions regarding the
impact of female relative to male managers on this distribution of women across levels of the
organizational hierarchy, the insignificant likelihood ratio chi-square for each year indicates that
this independence model is a good fit for the data. The distribution of employees across the
hierarchy does not differ based on the gender of the manager, therefore, to the extent that
non-managerial jobs are skewed in terms of gender, they are equally segregated regardless of
the gender of the branch manager.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Female Managers and Flexible Work Arrangements
Figure 4 shows the proportion of non-managerial employees, both male and female, working
part-time by manager gender. Employees are nearly twice as likely to work part-time (5.9% vs.
10.8%) when reporting to a female versus a male manager (p<.1; LR chi-square = 3.17, d.f. = 1).
Figure 5 shows the relative use of part-time by male and female non-managerial employees
reporting to female versus male managers. The proportion of female, relative to male,
employees working part-time is significantly higher among employees reporting to both female
(p<.1; LR chi-square = 3.01, d.f. = 1) and male managers (p<.05; LR chi-square = 5.33, d.f. = 1)
indicating that women are more likely to work part-time. While these differences in the use of
flexibility are interesting, they do not indicate whether female managers are more egalitarian in
allowing their male and female subordinates to use flexible work arrangements. As with the job
segregation analyses, this is simply a descriptive pattern as these data do not provide insight
into the mechanisms leading to this outcome. For example, not knowing the proportion of men
versus women that requested part-time work makes it equally plausible that 1) men are
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requesting part-time work at lower rates or 2) managers are showing a preference for female
employees in deciding who to allow to work part-time. In order to isolate the mechanisms at
play in creating these observed patterns it would be necessary to identify which employees
requested flexible work arrangements (for a similar discussion of the limitations of post-hire
data see Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Fernandez and Abraham 2013).
[Insert FIG 4 and FIG 5 about here]
In order to assess whether this evident gender inequality in use of flexibility differs for those
reporting to female versus male managers, Model 2 in table 6 presents the likelihood ratio chi-
squared statistics and related p-values for the log-linear independence models for each of the
four years included in these data. This model tests the null hypotheses that the distribution of
male and female employees to part-time work is independent of manager gender. While I am
not able to draw any conclusions regarding the impact of female relative to male managers on
this distribution of men and women to part-time work, the results indicate that the relative
proportion of men and women working part-time does not differ based on the gender of the
manager. In other words, to the extent that there exists gender inequality in the use of
flexibility in this setting, this inequality is consistent for employees reporting to both male and
female managers.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Given the rise in women's presence among managers, this study aims to uncover whether, and
under what conditions, female managers reduce gender inequality among the non-managerial
employees reporting to them. While recent studies have attempted to identify the impact of
female managers on gender inequality, results have been mixed, leaving this question
unanswered. Using unique personnel data from 120 branches of a large retail financial services
firm where the reporting structure is identified and managers have authority over employee
outcomes, I find that female managers contribute to differences in outcomes for subordinates
in two distinct ways. First, they provide greater access to equitable wages, but only among
employees in the lowest level organizational position. While the overall gender wage gap does
not differ based on manager gender, female managers do attenuate gender inequality in wages
among tellers. Second, they provide greater access to flexible work arrangements for both male
and female employees. While I do not find that female managers are more equitable in term of
access to flexible work arrangements, both male and female employees reporting to female
managers are nearly twice as likely to work part-time.
These findings have several implications for research on the organizational bases gender
inequality and workplace flexibility. By employing a case-study design this study helps to
reconcile the divergent findings of extant research. This is the first study to provide direct
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evidence of the relationship between the gender of the manager and the gendered outcomes
of subordinates in a setting where actual manager-subordinate relationships are identified and
managers have control over outcomes. By illustrating the power of an organizational grounded
approach for developing a more complete understanding of the role of women in management
on gender inequality of subordinates, this study serves as a useful corrective to past
approaches which seek to address the organizational bases of gender inequality employing only
indirect evidence on these questions.
In terms of the impact of female managers on wage inequality, this study ascertains the
importance of identifying managerial control over setting wages. Given Penner and colleagues'
(2012) finding that female managers have no impact on wage inequality among the low-skill,
supermarket workforce they study, my finding that female managers attenuate wage inequality
among tellers is somewhat surprising. I propose that this study casts further doubt on Penner
et al.'s (2012) claim that, despite the collective bargaining agreement, female managers in their
setting have the necessary control to impact wage inequality. Given that differences in wage
inequality can only be attributed to the managers to the extent that those managers have
control over allocating wages, their finding may result from the fact that managers lack control
over wages in this setting.
Furthermore, attempting to identify whether female managers attenuate gender wage
inequality without looking at within-job wage inequality may lead to an incomplete answer. If
conclusions about the impact of female managers were drawn solely by comparing the overall
wage inequality across all branch positions, one would claim that female managers do not
reduce gender inequality. A more careful examination of wage inequality within specific branch
positions, however, reveals boundary conditions regarding when female managers may
attenuate inequality, namely among employees in lower level organizational positions. Future
research identifying additional boundary conditions for when female managers are more apt to
impact gender inequality is needed.
While these data do not allow me to determine the mechanisms, previous research is
informative in identifying a potential explanation for the finding that female managers only
attenuate wage inequality in the lower organizational ranks. Value threat theory suggests that
as the lower status group, women may fear that others will not perceive them as valuable
members of the organization making them less apt to support other women within the
organization. It is plausible that female managers feel less threat breaking with the norm of
wage inequality among employees in the lower-level branch position of teller than in higher-
level positions, such as account executive. While this is plausible, additional research, is
necessary to identify to whether female managers decisions to reduce inequality is driven by
concerns over their own organizational value. Interviews with both male and female managers
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would be informative for identifying the degree to which female managers are more concerned
with how organizational others perceive them. A second possibility is to compare the impact of
female managers on gender inequality across settings where their status relative to male
counterparts varies.
By examining gender differences in the allocation of an understudied resource, namely
flexibility, by managers, this study also broadens our knowledge of whether female managers
impact resource allocation to subordinates differently from male managers. This finding, at a
minimum, suggests that employees reporting to female managers may be more able to
leverage flexible work options. As aforementioned, without knowledge of how employees were
given flexibility it is unclear whether employees reporting to female managers requested
flexibility at a higher rate or if female managers are more accommodating in extending
flexibility. However, irrespective of which mechanism is leading to the higher rate of flexibility
among those reporting to female managers, this finding indicates that working for a female
manager increases an employee's likelihood of using a flexible work arrangement. In order to
isolate the mechanisms at play future research should aim to examine differences not only in
flexibility use but in requesting flexibility for those reporting to female as compared to male
managers.
Additionally, the higher likelihood for employees reporting to female managers to use flexibility
may be particularly beneficial for women. In recent studies, women have been found to
experience depletion, or detrimental effects from their multiple roles, whereas men tend to
experience enrichment, or positive spillover effects (Rothbard 2001). Therefore, the fact that
employees use flexibility more when reporting to a female manager may serve as an indirect
benefit for female employees reporting to female, as opposed to male, managers. To the extent
that flexibility is more valued by women as it reduces the negative experience from balancing
work and non-work responsibilities, the higher likelihood for employees to use flexibility when
reporting to a female manager may be more beneficial for women, than for men, reporting to
female managers.
In addition to advantages to the individual employee, some studies have posited that flexibility
is associated with positive organizational outcomes. For individuals who prefer greater
segmentation between their work and non-work lives, flexible work options that facilitate this
separation have been found to lead to greater organizational commitment (Rothbard, Phillips,
and Dumas 2005). This suggests that if female managers are both extending flexibility more and
to the employees most in need to segmentation they may positively impact both their
subordinates and organizational outcomes. There is promise for future research to unpack the
managerial process of allocating flexibility to male and female employees. A more in-depth
examination of this process in a setting with the same features of the organization studied
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here, namely where reporting structures are identified and managers have control over
allocating flexibility, is necessary. Specifically, gaining access to formal flexible work
arrangements would allow for a comparison of different forms of flexibility and provide insight
into employee, as well as employer, preferences in terms of flexible work arrangements.
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Table 1. Composition of Branch Positions and Mean Hourly Wages for
All Retail Branch Employees, 1999
Composition
Percentage*
Hourly Wages
Mean (SD) Min
Teller
Representative
Officer
Account Executive
21.17
(101)
14.47
(69)
34.59
(165)
4.82
(23)
12.24 (1.82) 7.50 22.50
14.89 (1.83) 11.27 20.34
19.11 (3.37) 13.08 34.01
22.85 (3.80) 13.44 31.25
Relationship Manager
Branch Manager
Overall
9.85
(47)
15.09
(72)
100
(477)
32.17 (7.90)
33.98 (7.55)
19.23 53.31
21.64 55.82
20.76 (9.01) 7.50 55.82
*Parentheses indicate number of employees
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Table 2. Basic Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Interest for Managers,1999
Overall Female Managers Male Managers
Mean (SD) Percentage Mean (SD) Percentage Mean (SD) Percentage t-test
Hourly Wages 33.98 (7.55) 33.13 (7.11) 34.69 (7.93)
Age (in years) 42.33 (9.02) 44.28 (9.68) 40.68 (8.19)
Tenure 10.20 (9.17) 12.72 (8.44) 8.07 (9.32) *
Parttime 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female 45.83
African-American 12.50 12.12 12.82
Asian 15.28 15.15 15.38
Caucasian 63.89 69.70 58.97
Hispanic 8.33 3.03 12.82
N 72 33 39
FN: This table is for 1999, but all patterns are the same for all 4 years.
*** p 5 0.001, ** p 0.01, * p 5 0.05, A p 5 0.10 (all two-sided t-tests comparing employees reporting to
female versus male managers)
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Table 3. Basic Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Interest for Non-managerial Employees, by Employee Gender and
Manager Gender, 1999
All Employees
Size
Female
Female Employees
Hourly Wages
Part-time
Age (in years)
Tenure (in years)
Married
African-American
Asian
Caucasian
Hispanic
Male Employees
Hourly Wages
Part-time
Age (in years)
Tenure (in years)
Married
African-American
Asian
Caucasian
Hispanic
N 405
Overall
Mean (SD) Percentage
8.12 (2.91)
69.36
16.64 (4.99)
38.49 (10.33)
7.68 (6.51)
22.55 (9.01)
36.63 (9.95)
5.64 (7.41)
10.21
43.66
5.99
32.75
42.25
19.01
2.48
Female Managers
Mean (SD) Percentage
7.40 (2.24)
16.30 (4.39)
38.63 (10.43)
8.08 (7.44)
21.51 (8.60)
38.64 (11.26)
6.31 (8.42)
46.28
8.26
22.31
53.72
15.70
71.56
13.11
39.34
7.38
31.15
44.26
17.21
4.44
57.78
4.44
24.44
55.56
15.56
167
Male Managers
Mean (SD) Percentage
8.62 (3.21)
16.71 (5.31)
38.05 (10.16)
6.21 (5.58)
22.55 (9.18)
35.15 (8.83)
4.96 (6.59)
67.82
8.02
46.91
4.94
33.95
40.74
20.37
1.32
39.47
10.53
21.05
52.63
15.79
238
FN: This table is for 1999, but all patterns are the same for all 4 years.
*** p 5 0.001, ** p 5 0.01, * p 5 0.05, A p 5 0.10 (all two-sided t-tests comparing employees reporting to female
versus male managers)
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t-test
*
*
Table 4. Generalized Estimation Equation Regression Models Predicting Log Hourly Wages of Non-
Managerial Employees
Female
Manager Female
Manager Female x Female
Representative
Officer
Executive
Relationship Manager
Rep x Mgr Female
Officer x Mgr Female
Exec x Mgr Female
Relation x Mgr Female
Rep x Female
Officer x Female
Exec x Female
Relation x Female
Rep x Female x Mgr Female
Officer x Female x Mgr Female
Exec x Female x Mgr Female
Relation x Female x Mgr Female
Model 1
-0.149***
(0.024)
Model 2
-0.157***
(0.025)
-0.052***
(0.015)
0.026
(0.018)
Model 3
-0.050*
(0.020)
-0.032^
(0.018)
0.039^
(0.021)
0.164***
(0.024)
0.373***
(0.020)
0.581***
(0.031)
0.791***
(0.032)
-0.003
(0.031)
0.006
(0.024)
0.006
(0.046)
-0.043
(0.043)
-0.009
(0.027)
-0.030
(0.023)
-0.058
(0.050)
-0.077A
(0.044)
-0.043
(0.035)
-0.024
(0.029)
0.036
(0.070)
-0.021
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Black
Asian
Hispanic
Age
Tenure
Married
Married x Female
Branch Size (num. employees)
Manager Tenure
Constant
N
Number of Groups
Time Periods
Wald Chi2
DF
-0.066*
(0.026)
-0.015
(0.023)
-0.103***
(0.023)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.016***
(0.001)
0.211***
(0.031)
-0.196***
(0.037)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
2.481***
(0.038)
2,649
1,110
4
816.37 *
17
-0.069**
(0.026)
-0.016
(0.023)
-0.103***
(0.023)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.016***
(0.001)
0.213***
(0.031)
-0.200***
(0.037)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
2.504***
(0.038)
2,649
1,110
4
845.64 *
19
(0.059)
-0.017
(0.014)
0.008
(0.012)
-0.018
(0.012)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.060***
(0.018)
-0.051*
(0.021)
-0.001*
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
2.325***
(0.025)
2,649
1,110
4
4840.82 *
35
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, A p<0.10
FN: All models include dummy variables for race, controls for employee age, employee age-squared,
employee tenure, employee tenure-squared, manager tenure, manager tenure-squared, size of
branch, and fixed effects for the state where the branch is located. The omitted category for race is
"caucasiian"; for job title is "teller"; for female is "male"; and for manager female is "manager male".
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Table 5. Comparing Predicted Hourly Salary (in $) for Typical Male
and Female Tellers by Manager Gender
Female Teller
Female Manager
11.98
Male Manager
11.90
Male Teller
Gender Wage Gap
in $
Fwage as % of Mwage
12.12
-0.13
98.91
12.51
-0.61
95.12
FN: Predicted values for hourly salary from Model 3 (Table 5) for a
typical teller profile: a white, single individual, working fulltime, with
average tenure and age reporting to a manager with average tenure.
Figure 2. Percent Female by Job for Non-Managerial Employees, 1999
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Figure 3. Percent Female by Job for Non-Managerial Employees, by Manager Gender, 1999
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Table 6. Log-Linear Tests of Independence between Joint Distribution of Non-Managerial Employees to Jobs or Parttime and Manager Ge
1999 1998 1997 1996
Likelihood Ratio Likelihood Ratio Likelihood Ratio Likelihood Ratio
Model Variablesa DF Chi-Square Chi-Square Chi-Square Chi-Squareb
Model 1: Job Allocation
Model 2: Parttime
N
[FTROES] [B] 9 9.05
(0.43)
[FP] [B] 3 4.21
(0.24)
405
P-values in parentheses.
a F = non-managerial employee gender (0 = male, 1 = female), M = manager female (0 = male, 1= female), T = teller, R = representative,
O = officer, E = account executive, S = relationship manager, and P = parttime (0=not parttime, 1 = parttime)
b Ukelihood Ration Chi-square statistic allows for a test of the null hypothesis that the joint distribution of non-managerial emplyee
gender and either job allocation or parttime is not independent of branch manager gender.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, A p<0.10
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I Female Managers
Male Managers
E
0%
Officer
Role
Relationship
Manager
12.86
(0.17)
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564
Figure 4. Percent Non-Managerial Employees Parttime, by Manager Gender, 1999
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Figure 5. Percent Non-Managerial Employees Parttime, by Manager Gender, 1999
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